Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

7-10-2013

CBIT 2.0 -- Executive Summary
David M. Hasen
Santa Clara University School of Law, david.hasen@colorado.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
David M. Hasen, CBIT 2.0 -- Executive Summary (2013),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/792

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

	
  
CBIT 2.0
Executive Summary
David Hasen*
Introduction
This Executive Summary summarizes a proposal (the “Proposal”) described in a
Special Report, titled “CBIT 2.0,” that is scheduled to appear on Aug. 26, 2013, in the
trade publication Tax Notes (the “Special Report”). The Proposal advocates adoption of
an updated version of the comprehensive business income tax, or CBIT, in place of
current taxes on business income.
The Treasury Department first proposed the CBIT in 1992. 1 In Treasury’s
version, which it developed as part of its report on the integration of the corporate and
individual tax bases (the “Treasury Report”), the CBIT would be levied at a flat, 31
percent rate, which equaled the then-maximum rate on individual income. Taxes on
distributions would be eliminated, including on interest payments from CBIT-covered
entities. Correlatively, interest paid by CBIT entities would generally be non-deductible.
The CBIT would apply not only to corporations, but also to partnerships and sole
proprietorships.
When the Treasury Report was published, the maximum rate on corporate
income was 34 percent. By pegging the CBIT rate to the then-maximum individual rate
and eliminating taxes on distributions, tax-motivated decisions to retain or distribute
entity-level earnings would be eliminated. By treating debt and equity equally, the tax
bias in favor of debt financing would be eliminated. And by subjecting all business
income to the same, single level of tax, the tax bias against conducting business in the
corporate form would be eliminated. In Treasury’s calculations, these benefits, together
with the repeal of most business tax expenditures, would result in a tax that was
approximately revenue-neutral when compared with existing law, despite the loss of tax
revenue from dividend distributions and from the sale or exchange of interests in CBIT
entities, and despite the reduction in the top corporate rate from 34 to 31 percent.
Since 1992, a number of changes to the business environment have made the
CBIT as originally proposed unworkable. In particular, there is substantial pressure for
the U.S. to make its business tax rate more competitive with the rates in effect in other
OECD countries. Therefore, it is not feasible to peg the CBIT rate at the maximum
individual rate. Additionally, known fiscal commitments would make it difficult to forgo
all taxes on distributions even if entity-level rates did not drop. Finally, top individual
rates have moved substantially above top corporate rates, meaning that even in the
absence of a drop in rates at the entity level, a substantial tax incentive for earnings
retention has arisen.
The Proposal represents an effort to address these developments while preserving
the principal and quite substantial benefits the CBIT would confer. The main
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“Report of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the Individual and
Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Once,” Jan. 1992. The Report is available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/integration-paper.aspx#summary.
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modification is the addition of a tax on distributions and capital gains for high earners.
However, unlike the business income tax itself, which would remain a tax on income, the
distribution tax would operate as a cash-flow consumption tax on distributees. It would
be implemented by means of a tax on distributions to high earners, offset by a
corresponding deduction for distributions timely reinvested.
Such a dual-track system would address many of the problems that have long
beset the taxation of business income, yet it would have comparatively minor structural
effects on other areas of the tax law, including in particular the taxation of cross-border
investment, whether of U.S. persons abroad or of non-U.S. persons in U.S.-based
activities. In addition to the efficiencies described above, it would result in substantial
simplification, permitting the repeal of much of Subchapter C and virtually all of
Subchapters K and S. Its principal detriment (from the point of view, at least, of a
normative income tax) would be the conversion of part of the income tax on high earners
to a consumption tax. As explained below and argued in greater detail in the Special
Report, the objections to a shift to explicit consumption taxation solely for such
distributions do not appear to be persuasive.
Part I of this Executive Summary lays out the Proposal, Part II discusses
incentive effects, Part III touches briefly on international aspects, Part IV examines
revenue effects, and Part V replies to anticipated objections.
I. The Proposal
The principal reform recommendations are as follows:
1. Replace the tax on corporate income with a flat tax on net business income,
imposed without regard to the form in which the business is conducted. Sole
proprietorships would be included. Thirty percent is a almost certainly at
least revenue-neutral and likely revenue-positive when compared against
2011 law (the most recent year for which revenue figures are available).
2. Eliminate the deduction for interest paid by businesses subject to CBIT.
3. Eliminate targeted business tax incentives and preferences such as
accelerated depreciation, deductions for start-up costs and other business tax
expenditures.
4. Replace the tax on interest and dividends received from CBIT entities with a
grossed-up tax on distributions (dividends or interest) to individuals, but only
to the extent their marginal tax bracket exceeds the CBIT rate. Distributions
to distributees in lower brackets would be tax-free. The gross-up would
ensure that entity-level income is taxed at the full marginal rate applicable to
individuals in marginal brackets above the CBIT rate (disregarding the timevalue benefit of delays in personal spending). Gross-up rates of 7.1 and 13.7
percent correspond to overall rates of 35 and 39.6 percent.
5. Apply the same grossed-up taxes on high earners on gains from the sale or
exchange of CBIT equity interests or debt instruments issued by CBIT
entities.
6. Provide an above-the-line deduction to individuals to the extent amounts
received subject to the tax on distributions or gains from sale or exchange are
reinvested within one year of distribution (or within some other specified
period).
7. Repeal the withholding taxes on interest and dividends paid to non-U.S.
persons.
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8. Adopt, in some cases in modified form, the other recommendations made in
the Treasury Report necessary to implement the CBIT, including in particular
the transition rules.2
If adopted as proposed, the overall effect would be to tax business income at a
rate that is roughly comparable to that imposed by many OECD countries. (As of 2012,
nominal national corporate tax rates in OECD countries ranged from 8.5 percent
(Switzerland) to 35 percent (U.S.).3) The denial of the deduction for interest expense
would make the tax law neutral between debt and equity as a choice for business finance.
Persons in marginal tax brackets not above the entity bracket would not be subject to
direct tax on business earnings: Because creditors and equity holders are taxed on interest
and dividends, respectively, only to the extent their marginal rate exceeds the entity rate,
the CBIT operates as a withholding tax and not in addition to the regular individual
income tax. Similarly, reporting allocable interest expense to non-U.S. creditors provides
an easy mechanism by which foreign jurisdictions that tax on a residence basis can treat
the denial of the interest deduction as a creditable withholding tax. The imposition of a
surtax on distributions is designed to preserve much of the progressivity of the income
tax and to provide for adequate revenue while maintaining international competitiveness.
Permitting a deduction for distributions otherwise subject to the surtax on amounts timely
reinvested converts the tax on distributions (but not the entity-level tax) to a consumption
tax for amounts received to the extent the distributee’s marginal rate exceeds the CBIT
rate. The purpose of this reform is to discourage tax-motivated entity-level retention of
earnings.
II. Incentive Effects
The principal advantages of the CBIT as originally proposed were that it
eliminated the tax biases against the corporate form and in favor of debt finance, and that
it provided for dramatic simplification by permitting the repeal of subchapters S and K
and of the rules on distributions from C corporations. In addition, if Congress were to
follow Treasury’s companion recommendation that business tax expenditures be
dramatically curtailed, efficiencies in business activity and further simplification would
be realized.
The Proposal preserves these benefits (except for the full simplification of
distribution taxes) and, in addition, addresses the problem of tax-motivated earnings
retention. This problem has resurfaced as top marginal rates have recently moved
substantially above top corporate rates and is likely to become worse in the absence of
explicit relief, because of the pressure to lower entity-level rates. By providing for
consumption tax treatment on taxes that would apply to distributions, the tax incentive to
retain earnings is largely eliminated. In contrast to the original CBIT, the rules for
distributions cannot be eliminated under the Proposal, because of the need to retain a tax
on distributions to higher-bracket individuals.
III. International Aspects
The Proposal generally follows Treasury’s recommendation to separate business
tax reform from other areas of tax reform, to the extent possible. Accordingly, no
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See generally Treasury Report, 43-60.
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OECD, “2012 Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income,” col. 1.: “Central government
corporate income tax rate.”
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recommendations are offered regarding whether or how the U.S. international tax rules
should be amended, except to the extent necessary to ensure that the basic objectives of
the Proposal are realized. However, because one of the Proposal’s objectives is to enable
Congress to maintain a competitive tax rate on foreign-source business income of U.S.
persons, the Proposal departs from Treasury’s recommendation to leave intact the doubletax treatment of foreign-source income of U.S. persons (albeit with an ordering rule,
under the original CBIT, on distributions that would have ameliorated the double tax to
some extent4). Instead, foreign income taxes paid would be treated as creditable for all
CBIT purposes, assuming the existing rules on foreign-source income remain largely
unchanged (or become more residence-based than they currently are). Alternatively, if
the U.S. system becomes more territorial in nature, the Proposal advocates treating
foreign taxes paid as a full substitute for the CBIT, assuming the amount of foreign taxes
paid otherwise satisfies the requirements for exemption from U.S. tax at the entity level.
Other changes to the international tax rules that Treasury recommended are
carried over. These include the repeal of the withholding tax on dividend and nonportfolio interest payments to non-U.S. persons and the extension of the availability of
the indirect, or deemed, foreign tax credit to all CBIT entities otherwise meeting the
ownership requirements for the credit.
IV. Revenue Effects
The Special Report does not provide a revenue estimate. It does, however,
attempt to show that under conservative assumptions, a CBIT rate of 30 percent on a
clean business tax base with distribution taxes of 7.1 and 13.7 percent on taxpayers
currently in, respectively, the 35 and 39.6 percent brackets (subject to deduction if timely
reinvested) is almost certainly revenue-neutral when compared against a baseline of 2011
law and likely revenue-positive against that baseline. The conservative assumptions
include:
•
•

•

that Congress provides relief to lower-bracket distributees of dividends and
interest through a credit for the CBIT paid;
that the elimination of both interest inclusions and interest deductions is
revenue-neutral rather than revenue-positive, despite the substantial tax
incentive for borrowing; and
that Congress takes no steps to ameliorate base erosion and profit-shifting
activities of U.S. multinationals.

If these assumptions were relaxed, a revenue-neutral rate in the mid-20 percent
range may be attainable.5
V. Reply to Objections
This section briefly addresses two anticipated objections to the Proposal: first,
that the adoption of consumption-tax treatment on distributions to high earners is
inconsistent with the U.S. income tax, and second, that the Proposal will be regressive
with respect to income because it will tax all business income at a flat rate of
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See Treasury Report, at 55.
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Revenue neutrality is assumed solely for purposes of determining the feasibility of the
Proposal, not for purposes of determining the proper CBIT and distribution rates. In light of
known and expected future spending commitments, revenue increases will almost certainly be
necessary.
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approximately 30 percent, even if that income would be taxed at a lower rate under
current law. Both objections are addressed in greater detail in the Special Report.
A. Partial Consumption Taxation
In the following discussion, it is important to bear in mind that the consumption
tax treatment advocated in the Proposal applies only to the tax that will apply on
distributions (whether of interest or dividends) to high-bracket distributees. The CBIT
itself remains a tax on income. By offering a deduction against the distribution tax for
distributions that are timely reinvested, the Proposal defers tax on distributions (to the
extent otherwise taxable) until they are drawn down for consumption. The overall effect
is to apply consumption taxation to what amounts to a surtax on distributions for highbracket taxpayers. Such an arrangement may seem incongruous in the context of what
otherwise appears to be a system of income, not consumption, taxation.
However, as noted in the Special Report, the current tax system already contains
a number of consumption tax features and is more properly characterized as a hybrid
income-consumption tax than an income tax. These features include the realization rule,
or the principle that capital gains and losses generally are not subject to tax until they are
disposed of; the availability of retirement and other deferred compensation vehicles that
operate under explicit consumption tax treatment; and the taxation of owner-occupied
housing. The addition of another consumption tax element (to the limited extent it
replaces an element that operates as an income tax) merely moves the system further in
the direction of consumption taxation; it does not transform an otherwise “pure” income
tax system into a hybrid system.
Secondly, because of the elasticity under current law of earnings distributions in
closely-held entities to distribution taxes and because of clientele effects in the case of the
ownership of large, publicly-traded corporations, consumption taxation already is in
effect for most entity-level earnings to the extent a distribution tax applies to them. In
particular, closely-held “C” corporations can defer distributions until such time as their
owners wish to use the distributions for consumption, while investors in publicly-held
corporations can choose to invest in “growth” stock rather than dividend-paying stock if
they are tax-sensitive to distributions; for these investors, the cash-out occurs in the form
of a sale of stock rather than a tax-timed distribution, again when it is time to consume.
To the extent this description of investor and firm behavior applies to existing
distribution decisions and ownership choices, consumption taxation already is in effect,
and the shift to explicit consumption taxation of distributions amounts to a shift in the
conditions under which consumption tax applies rather than a shift in the tax base: In
place of consumption taxation of distributions at the price of inefficient earnings
retention, the same consumption taxation applies, but without inefficient trapping of
earnings in the entity in which they arise.
Finally, it is not clear that there is anything amiss with consumption taxation, or
at least partial consumption taxation, especially when adopted in the form recommended
here. The usual objections to consumption taxation are that it is regressive and that it is
incapable of generating adequate revenue. In light of the fact that consumption taxation
effectively applies already to most otherwise taxable distributions, the revenue concern
should be minimal. Further, the distribution tax applies only to high-income individuals.
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B. Potential Regressivity
The Proposal assumes a flat rate of 30 percent on business income. Thirty percent
would represent an increase for taxable units currently in lower brackets that earn
business income either directly or through a pass-through entity. However, Congress
could ameliorate the effect by providing a credit for lower-bracket owners against their
personal taxes, and, indeed, the Special Report assumes Congress does provide such a
credit for purposes of analyzing revenue effects. Even with such a credit, a 30 percent
CBIT rate seems easily within reach without loss of revenue (when compared against a
2011 baseline), and a lower rate may well be within reach even on these assumptions.
Further study would be required to make a proper revenue estimate.
Even if Congress chooses not to provide relief through a credit, the progressivity
effects of a 30 percent CBIT would be unclear. They depend not only on average
effective tax rates but also on the use of tax revenues and on the allocative effects of
adopting the Proposal. As regards the former, if outlays are adjusted so that increased
revenue is returned to lower-bracket individuals through spending programs (whether
direct or indirect), the overall effect would not be to reduce progressivity. As regards
allocative effects, if adoption of the Proposal increases opportunities for persons currently
in lower brackets to generate income, the nominal reduction in progressivity may be
ameliorated or overcome by real, after-tax income growth for low-bracket businesses.
Conclusion
Three considerations will be of particular concern to Congress as it considers
major business tax reform: 1. maintaining or enhancing the competitiveness of U.S.
businesses and of the U.S. as a favorable investment environment; 2. simplification; and
3. meeting revenue commitments. The Proposal is designed to address all three. By
keeping business-level rates low, it improves the position of both U.S. business and the
U.S. itself as a market for foreign investors. By eliminating much of the complexity in
existing law, the Proposal dramatically reduces compliance and administrative costs; and
by providing for a tax on distributions to higher-income taxpayers, the Proposal preserves
the ability of the system to raise adequate revenue.
In addition, the Proposal dramatically enhances efficiency in that it removes the
three main tax-motivated biases that infect the current system of business taxation: the
bias against the corporate form, the bias in favor of debt finance, and the bias in favor of
earnings retention. Further efficiencies and simplification would be realized to the extent
Congress repeals base-narrowing business tax incentives.
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